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This chapter will provide an overview and analysis of the experiences of flooding in England since 
the end of the twentieth century with a view to informing debate in other countries. A critical 
reflection on the events of the last decade is particularly illuminating; encompassing a complete 
readjustment of our understanding of the sources of risk and subsequently exposing deficiencies 
in the ability of related governance frameworks to respond. The response to a series of damaging 
events from the scientific and policy making community was relatively swift, and included a 
significant change to the dominant paradigm from flood defence to flood risk management. This 
fundamental transition did, however, lead to a cascading series of interrelated governance 
implications and the development of new socio-technical assemblages, some of which were 
easier to anticipate than others. The effects encompassed alterations to the related methodology 
and a more neoliberal approach to risk management with repercussions for new responsibilities 
amongst a wider array of professions. The shift of the main source of flood risk from the rivers 
and sea towards surface water and drains was sudden and largely driven by forcing trends in 
climate and urbanization, creating the potential for lessons to be passed on to other countries 
who may experience similar pressures in the future; in essence to question the governance 
foundations shaping intervention – do they have longevity or, as was experienced in England, 
may they be castles on sand? 
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If one thinks about flooding, what perceptions and images does it conjure? For most, if not all, it 
will be related to the sea or rivers being driven by powerful natural forces creating the potential 
to detrimentally impact on people and places. Similarly, if one considers how to manage flood 
risk, attention will logically focus on the provision of hard defences with a view to ‘holding back’ 
water. This chapter aims to confront these deeply ingrained perceptions by providing an insight 
into how a fuller understanding of the shifting sources of flooding in England has presented a 
fundamental challenge to understanding the risk, the most appropriate governance frameworks 
and the efficacy of the selected managerial responses; an experience that should provide 
valuable lessons for other countries subject to varying flood risks. 
An accurate knowledge of the extent of the differing sources of risk is critical - not only may they 
demand completely different mitigation and adaptation measures, but, as this chapter will 
explain, they may operate outside of traditional scientific, financial and managerial frameworks, 
which have been mainly designed for structural responses. For example, defending the line 
against storm surges presents a very different proposition to addressing emerging threats 
generated from an excess of surface water in urban areas. Perhaps surprisingly, it is the latter 
that is now by far the biggest source of flood risk in England; a change that has only recently been 
recognised and its implications are still being considered within academia and practice. The 
effects of this shift in flood sources should not be underestimated – as it challenges hundreds of 
years of perception underpinned by supportive and interconnected governance paradigms, 
methodologies, professions and financial systems.  
This chapter will firstly outline the logical reasons for developing the conventional approach to 
flood defence before analysing why it became subject to such rapid and sustained critique. It will 
then discuss the implications for governance that this shift in the sources of flood risk presented. 
Significantly, the potential forcing effects of climate change and urbanization on surface runoff 
means that the debate and inherent managerial difficulties experienced within the highly 
developed built environment in England since the turn of the 21st century may provide valuable 
lessons for other cities and countries. As will be explained in the following section, there has been 
a tendency to first experience detriment before action occurs, but this reactive approach does 
not necessarily have to be replicated elsewhere. This does, however, entail critical reflection 
upon the limits to knowledge, engaging with uncertainty and re-examining systems of 
governance – all of which are currently in process within England. 
FIRM FOUNDATIONS OR CASTLES ON SAND? 
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The United Kingdom (UK) is subject to both capricious seas and volatile weather patterns, which 
has contributed to the view that we have more ‘weather’ than most countries; with its sheer 
changeability leading to the well worn truism regarding it being a peculiarly British obsession. 
Like many aphorisms, there is more than a kernel of truth in this assertion and one unexpected 
benefit of this national fixation is a rich source of flooding records stretching back over 1000 
years. 
Within his 8th century Ecclesiastical History of the English People the Venerable Bede, a monastic 
scholar, emphasised the geographical vulnerability of the country to the extremes of weather, 
detailing amongst other factors the effect of the seasons and the behaviour of rivers and the sea 
(White 2010). A further, more vivid example is provided by the Anglo Saxon Chronicle, which 
provides an important account of British history from the Middle Ages up to 1154 (Britannia 
2007). Flooding events are recorded frequently throughout the document, with one of the 
notable events of 1014 described as: 
This year, on the eve of St. Michael's day, came the great sea-flood, which spread wide over 
this land, and ran so far up as it never did before, overwhelming many towns, and an 
innumerable multitude of people. 
In addition to coastal flooding, there is also a long record of flood events with regard to individual 
watercourses. The river Severn, one of the more notoriously flood prone watercourses in 
England, has been recorded as flooded 697 times since the first incident was noted in 1236 (Law 
et. al. 2010). The view that inundation is driven from watercourses and the sea is part of the 
national psyche in many countries beyond England, and, as we can see, there is usually good 
historical evidence why this should be the case.  The reasons for the perception of flooding as 
being directly related to these sources are therefore understandable, having their roots in 
cultural history and harsh experience. 
Considering this viewpoint, the approaches to managing flood water also developed logically, 
focused on increasing the defence against the undesirable intrusion of water onto land. A 
discrete and conveniently spatial risk, such as from these clearly definable sources, could 
therefore be effectively addressed via a strong wall alongside the sea or river. Similarly, an excess 
of precipitation in an urban area could be managed by an engineered drainage network designed 
to efficiently transport water to safe outfalls. In order to operationalise this approach, 
professions were gradually developed to specialise in better understanding the natural world, 
ascertaining probability to risks and implementing these engineering-led solutions. Over time, 
institutions and governance frameworks were also established to support flood defence, with 
responsibilities allocated to dedicated expert agencies. When considering the growth in 
knowledge, scientific expertise, finances and technology for much of the last century there is 
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little doubt that great progress has been made in protecting people and property from the risk 
of flooding, and the success of this approach has helped it permeate across the globe. 
Yet, given these advances one could be forgiven for assuming that flooding should be lessening, 
its risk increasingly understood and the threats better managed. This view is, however, far 
removed from reality. Although the science and technologies used to control water in England 
gained in sophistication, perhaps surprisingly the actual experience of flooding increased – and 
not just in isolated areas, but in a consistent manner across the globe. Whilst questions may be 
legitimately raised concerning population growth and the volume of people exposed, managerial 
strategies, particularly those in more technologically and scientifically advanced nations, should 
still be able to cope with long term, predictable social and land use trends.  This is an important 
point to make, and provides the first initial challenge to our perception of both the causes of 
flooding and the subsequent efficacy of the managerial response. If societies are so adept at 
managing these events why do they keep experiencing severe and highly damaging floods? And 
why do they appear to be increasing in frequency? 
 
Figure 1: Aerial image of flooding in Cockermouth, UK during the November 2009 floods (© 
Environment Agency/Peter Smith Photography). 
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A common problem associated with policies to hold back water are that they may also increase 
risk via the ‘escalator effect’ (Parker 1995) or ‘safe development paradox’ (Burby 2006), whereby 
the provision of flood defences may make the land behind them appear more attractive for 
development. Allied to this is the driving role played by climate change and urbanization trends. 
However, given the progress in many fields over the 20th century this chapter argues that it is 
also due to the highly imperfect understanding of the shifting nature of flood risk. In short, one 
of the reasons why flooding has continued to occur is that despite many perceptions it is not one 
homogeneous risk; a simple inundation of land may be the common result, but in practice there 
are an array of distinct sources, each subject to differing drivers and which are not analogous. In 
practice, flood risk comprises a number of spatially variable sources; from the well-understood 
threats emerging from rivers and the sea to emerging risks from urban runoff, infrastructure 
failure and rising groundwater levels – each of which may demand differing adaptation strategies. 
The modern pluralistic nature of the threat challenged the long-held hegemony of perceptions, 
governance processes and appropriate intervention measures in England, and deserves equal 
consideration elsewhere. 
SHIFTING SOURCES: GLOBAL, NATIONAL AND CITY PERSPECTIVES 
Perhaps counter intuitively, given the rise in knowledge concerning flood defence, countries all 
over the world are becoming increasingly subject to flooding, making it one of the most frequent 
and widespread natural hazards. The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a rising 
number of flood events worldwide; a general trend being experienced on all continents, 
regardless of how advanced they may be (White 2010). If technology and science was so effective 
one would expect that these advantages would be reflected spatially, yet from a global 
perspective floods occur surprisingly well distributed. The uniform nature of the rise in flood 
events provides a challenge to how this hazard has been addressed, questioning the long-term 
efficacy of the dominant flood defence approach that has been applied on an international basis.  
Although this information provides an argument for more effective intervention, there are a 
number of caveats. The first, concerns the theory of time-space compression (Harvey 1989) 
within which increasingly time appears to accelerate and space is compressed – or put more 
simply, technology may make it easier to quickly document events, regardless of where in the 
world they occur. From this perspective, contemporary societies may seemingly experience a rise 
in the recording of floods in comparison with less information-rich times. Secondly, there may 
also be disparities in defining what exactly constitutes a flood particularly when comparing 
records collated from differing spatial and temporal sources. Is it a simple inundation of water 
onto land? Do people and properties have to be affected? If so, how many would be required to 
turn a natural event into a disaster? 
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Whilst we should problematise the argument for a long-term and global rising trend in flood 
events, there is greater confidence at the national scale. From an English perspective, recent data 
clearly shows an increasing number of damaging floods, particularly since 1998, thereby helping 
to counter the possible obfuscatory effects of space and time. These flood events resulted in 
three long established perceptions being confronted: the first concerning the actual sources of 
flood risk; the second relating to how floods have been governed and the closely related third, 
regarding the most effective intervention approaches to be adopted. During the transition from 
the late 20th century to the early 21st these long held views were initially gradually undermined, 
and then with a startling swiftness, almost completely reconstructed. And, crucially, it was driven 
by a repeated series of extremely damaging national-scale flood events – most notably in 1998, 
2000, 2004 and 2007, supported by more localised, but very high profile incidents occurring in 
areas such as Boscastle, Carlisle and Cockermouth. 
In the aftermath of each serious flood incident reports were commissioned which were not only 
helpful in determining the issues connected with a specific event, but from a recent historical 
perspective taken together provide an insight into the gradual changing awareness of the nature 
of risks and its rapid and significant impact on the policy narrative. Whilst each new flood event 
can prove devastating for the communities affected, it also presents an opportunity to cross 
reference existing information on risk and help provide additional data on ascertaining a truer 
picture of the sources of, and exposure to, inundation. The lessons of the last decade 
demonstrate how the agenda has quickly developed. For example, the report investigating the 
Easter 1998 flood exposed deficiencies in areas such as forecasting, warning, emergency 
response, standards of defense, severity assessment and management structures and skills (Bye 
and Horner 1998). Yet, it was the cumulative effect of the more widespread and severe Autumn 
2000 flood suffered just two years later that Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott described as 
‘wake-up call’. Experiencing two huge events in quick succession that in some geographical areas 
the science estimated should only occur at least once in every 150 or 200 years inevitably casts 
doubt on the entire flood management process – particularly the methodologies associated with 
forecasting, prediction and exposure. 
In the aftermath of the 2000 flood, measures were taken to improve these issues with, for 
example, a review determining that 1,724,225 properties were at risk of fluvial, tidal and coastal 
flooding (National Audit Office 2001). During this period there was no real acknowledgement of 
other sources of flood risk, which provides an interesting snapshot of just how far, and fast, flood 
risk management has progressed in a decade. A further step forward occurred a few years later 
with the publication of the Foresight Future Flooding report (Evans et. al. 2004). This wide ranging 
document provided the scientific evidence base to drive the emerging significant policy shift from 
flood defence towards flood risk management discussed in more depth later. Although at this 
time around two million homes were again identified as being at risk from flooding from rivers 
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and the sea, climate change and urbanization were highlighted as powerful forcing drivers with 
exposure from surface water (incorporating urban runoff and local drainage failure) predicted to 
rise sharply from the highly uncertain level detailed in the report of around 80,000 properties.  
The need not just for better information but more sharing of data on this source was also now 
becoming recognised amongst stakeholders. For example, figures on drainage were not held by 
the same agency as conventional sources of flooding and were not even within the public sector; 
the privatisation of the water industry in 1989 created ten separate companies each holding what 
may be commercially sensitive information. Although there was a suggestion in the Foresight 
report that the number of properties exposed to surface water flooding was almost certainly 
underestimated, it is doubtful that even the most pessimistic commentator would have predicted 
the extent to which this would prove the case. 
In a related development, longer term and more sustainable water management methods began 
to influence the policy arena, underpinned by a move towards risk based approaches supported 
by scientific evidence. The ability to provide a consistently successful defence against flooding 
was now openly questioned, with a new pragmatism extolled and, despite the recent advances 
in knowledge and management, the message was that society should expect to experience 
periodic flooding, be prepared to ‘live with water’ and develop new working partnerships (White 
2010). Notwithstanding this newfound realism, the rapidly developing scientific evidence base, 
supported by national, regional and local policy initiatives, led to a growing sense that although 
modern flood risk was more unpredictable and complex than in the past, society was again 
beginning to master some of the intricacies. For example, flood risk maps were now available 
online and as part of the planning process new developments may be subject to Flood Risk 
Assessments, incorporating consideration of modeling and downstream impacts (Department of 
Communities and Local Government 2006).  
However, the wide scale summer 2007 flood inundated whole areas that were previously 
deemed to be ‘safe’. This is a key point to pause upon. Whilst the transition from defence to risk 
management appears a logical response, how successful can a risk based approach be if it is so 
difficult to be accurate? And to what extent is the uncertainty inherent in this strategy 
understood and communicated to decision makers? This wasn’t just a matter of a few degrees of 
probability, or a difference between a medium or high risk, but a failure to recognise whole 
swathes of the country as actually being exposed to flooding. As a result there was an increasing 
recognition that to date scientists and policy makers had concentrated on compiling information 
on the risk from coastal, estuarine or fluvial sources and there was a gap in knowledge concerning 
the extent of flooding from elsewhere, in particular from surface water and inadequate drainage 
(Pitt 2008).  
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In part response, the most current data has again been revised upward to suggest that 5.2million 
properties in England, or one in six of the total housing stock, are now at risk from flooding. With 
3.8 million of those newly recognised as being exposed to inundation from the hitherto largely 
unrecognised source of an excess of surface water (Environment Agency 2009). Further, this 
exposure will continue to rise even if all unsafe construction stopped tomorrow, due to a gradual, 
incremental rise in urbanization elsewhere in the catchment and possible increases in rainfall 
intensity due to climate change. Indeed, it has been recently estimated as ‘very likely’ that global 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions substantially increased the risk of the Autumn 2000 
event occurring (Pall et al. 2011).  
Despite only being newly formally included within calculations of national risk, flooding from 
surface water is now identified as the main source of flood risk in the country. Whilst changes in 
the definitions of ‘risk’ can vary slightly over time and between documents, Table One displays 
an accessible comparative overview of how quickly knowledge has changed regarding both the 
estimated number of people at risk and from which source, encapsulating data from advances in 
ascertaining exposure and the reviews of recent flood events. The table is designed to be useful 
as a didactic device; not necessarily with regard to attaching significance to the number of 
properties, but rather as a demonstration of the way that seemingly firm foundations can quickly 
be undermined and how academics and policy makers in countries outside England should learn 
from this experience and question what may ostensibly appear to be very certain scientific 
datasets. 
Table One: The changing knowledge of the sources of flood risk exposure in England since 2000 
(National Audit Office 2001; Evans et al. 2004; Environment Agency 2009). 
 
                                                                
1Note that 1 million properties are at risk from both sources of flooding (Environment Agency 2009). 
Year 
Estimated properties at risk by source 
Total 
Rivers and Sea Surface Water 
2000 1,724,225 0 1,724,225 
2004 1,740,000 80,000 1,820,000 
2009 2,400,000 3,800,000 5,200,0001 
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Within the space of nine years the overall estimated exposure to flood risk in England has more 
than tripled, with surface water and drainage emerging from being completely unacknowledged 
to accounting for two thirds of the total risk. Whilst reflecting on the rapidly changing data 
compiled during this time, the speed of development does inevitably expose flaws in both the 
evidence base and governance of flooding. However, the relatively quick response of the 
scientific and policy making community to identify, and adjust to, new and emerging risks should 
also be recognised. The shifting sands of what were thought to be relatively firm foundations in 
such a short space of time exposed, perhaps understandable deficiencies in fundamental aspects 
of flood risk management; knowledge gaps that had inhibited the ability to respond to all sources 
of flood risk. The financial and governance focus on structural defences merely addressed one 
part of the picture, and it was only after the inadequacies in this approach were revealed that 
changes were initiated. The events therefore provided the evidence and the momentum for what 
will be argued was a fundamental shift to how flood water was both perceived and managed. It 
may be that the experiences of policy makers in England, whereby damaging events demanded 
reviews, which in turn led to wide-ranging recommendations and responses, can provide salutary 
lessons to differing countries subject to similar climatological and societal drivers, particularly 
where there is a heavy focus on pursuing ‘defend the line’ approaches. 
Reducing further in scale to the city level, data from the ten local authorities that make up the 
Greater Manchester city region provides a similar reinforcing story of changing flood sources; 
albeit a more gradual and incremental shift in contrast with the succession of sharp shocks from 
the national perspective. The inland area is accustomed to managing a relatively high rainfall and 
has experienced floods from both riverine and surface water sources, yet analysis of the events 
and their causes provides supporting evidence of a localised shift in risk that reflects the national 
trend, with similar managerial and adaptation implications. 
Figure 2 outlines the differing frequency of these two flood types between two periods: from 
1945 to 1997; and from the first of the recent major national floods in 1998 until 2009. Overall, 
flooding from watercourses has steadily decreased, which has been more than offset by a rapid 
increase in surface water events, with the average up from 0.38 to 3.10 events per annum. Whilst 
the localised nature of these floods may not be as devastating as those on a national scale, their 
similar rising frequency and changing composition provides evidence of both the shift towards 
surface water flooding and the difficulties within the governance systems to both recognise, and 
adjust to, inundation from this source. On reflection it could be argued that there is some truth 
in the perception introduced at the start of the chapter that societies are getting better at 
managing floods – but as these figures suggest, just from what could be termed ‘traditional’ 
sources. The investment in river and sea defence has brought benefits, but while the focus has 
been centered here not only has the risk shifted elsewhere but it has grown in strength. The 
overall number of floods discussed at the start of the chapter does suggest that there have been 
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governance inadequacies, but this view is reinforced when analysing how governance 
frameworks have addressed the possible sources of inundation, where there has been a clear 
emphasis on floodplain protection via structural defences.  
 
 
Figure 2: Riverine and surface water flood events in Greater Manchester (Lawson and Carter 
2009). 
At its simplest level, the lack of success in preventing flood events, regardless of their scale, could 
be considered a series of governance failures – with an array of culpable stakeholders identified 
by the press and public from the government to planners to the Environment Agency. Yet, in the 
absence of experiencing serious and widespread flood events, and with no real international 
lessons to draw upon, one could be forgiven for assuming that the threat of inundation was both 
driven by rivers and the sea and under relative control. In reality, the evidence argues for a more 
pluralist approach; one that extends the view of flooding beyond the geographical floodplain and 
therefore challenges the traditional hegemony of existing governance frameworks that are 
overwhelmingly designed to deliver structural defences. As the chapter will also show, this shift 
is a work in progress and not only may there be an implementation gap between what a policy 
advocates and its translation into practice, but also a ‘governance deficit’ with surface water in 
particular being subject to a complex framework of responsibilities (Douglas et al. 2010). 
CASCADING GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS: PARADIGMS, METHODOLOGIES AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
Riverine Surface Water 
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The changing sources of flooding and the resulting paradigm shift from defence to risk 
management have had significant effects on fundamental issues such as the desired managerial 
approach and the actors and agencies charged with determining intervention - some of which 
have been easier to foresee than others.  The operationalisation initially required a change in 
methodological emphasis from the probability based technique developed throughout the 
twentieth century to a risk management approach focused on a broader scientific understanding. 
This in turn required a challenge to the professions, moving flooding beyond the realm of 
engineering towards other experts, most notably spatial planning. The changes in governance 
also had an effect on who is responsible for managing flood risk, with power and also 
accountability devolved away from the State and towards a wider array of stakeholders, including 
communities and individuals. 
In just over a decade managing flooding in England has moved to being within the remit of almost 
everyone, from government ministers to local authority planners to homeowners.  Considering 
the inertia and conservatism inherent in many of the areas of governance affected the response 
has been brisk, but the sheer scope of areas that required attention was undeniably challenging. 
Figure 3 summarizes the key governance implications which have been gradually revealed and 
implemented by the recent failure to protect people and places against flooding – a cascading 
series of managerial shifts that occurred once the move from flood defence to flood risk 
management was operationalised at the start of the 21st century. The information contained in 
the figure is not designed to delineate an absolute transfer of power or a dialectic between the 
technical and social, it is more about revealing new hybrids of knowledge, or even more simply, 
a direction of travel. This shift has provided the foundation of a more effective management of 
flooding and will be of relevance beyond the English case study. 
 
Figure 3: The interconnected cascade of recent and emerging shifts in the governance of flooding. 
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Each key aspect is discussed in more depth in the following sections which detail the interrelated 
cascading response to the realisation that the governance foundations designed to address flood 
risk were not as secure as previously thought. This involves analysis of the changing flood 
management paradigm, the methodology employed, a widening of the professions connected 
and a devolution in stakeholder responsibilities. 
PARADIGM CHANGES 
The succession of flood events combined with an awareness of the difficulties in managing water 
led to an acknowledgement within government that it was unrealistic to assume that all floods 
could be prevented. The long established ‘flood defence’ paradigm could not be effectively 
applied to the highly uncertain events of the 21st century, and there was a distinct shift towards 
‘flood risk management’ – an alternative, more comprehensive approach that aims to avoid new 
risk where possible and includes wider human and socio-economic factors. Moreover, 
recognizing that the problem was not just one of controlling water – as risk could also be 
beneficially influenced by managing people – effectively widened the stakeholders involved and 
the scope of policy influences with links to flooding. Whilst hard engineering and restrictions on 
floodplain development would continue to be important, non-structural measures began to be 
seriously discussed – ranging from green infrastructure to planning policies to insurance 
provision. The move towards pluralism also meant that the blame for any future floods would be 
both harder to assign and more widely distributed; within a defence paradigm arguably any 
flooding is a failure and the people responsible for implementing this approach culpable; within 
risk management some flooding could be expected and multiple stakeholders bear a share of the 
responsibility if any is assigned. 
A significant development driving this change was the gradual acknowledgement that flood risk, 
such as expressed in Table One, occurred from sources beyond rivers and the sea. It should be 
recognised that this threat still exists, and that structural defences are very effective mechanisms 
to address this source, but that the spatial and managerial certainty inherent in such an approach 
could not be easily transferred to the problem of surface water flooding. Essentially, the hard 
surfaces of a city perform as a multiplicity of artificial water pathways, operating in a complex 
and seemingly chaotic manner. The urban streets can therefore be considered as a part of the 
drainage infrastructure, and like any system can fail under high pressure.  
The difficulties presented to the flood defence approach connect to the ability to accurately 
predict the interaction between precipitation and the urban environment: where will the water 
pond or flow? What size of event will trigger dangerous levels of runoff? Which spatially discrete 
location will be exposed and how will climate change and urbanization affect this? But all these 
questions should be considered in the context of the dominant managerial paradigm of the time 
- if both the volume of runoff and the areas that generate and receive it are unpredictable, 
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irregular and multiplex how do you respond via structural measures? Or in short, how can a 
society adopt a‘defend the line’approach when a line can’t be identified? 
The shift towards flood risk management could better address the twin issues of urban runoff 
and the rise in uncertainty however; where floods cannot be reasonably prevented their effects 
can be prepared for and the impacts lessened. To operationalise the new paradigm therefore 
required a further reassessment of the methodology determining where and how we should 
intervene: flood defence is tightly connected to an engineered response supported by 
probabilistic calculations; flood risk management is more diffuse and combines wider non-
structural approaches. To be effective required a significant re-examination of the methodology 
employed by the scientific and policy making communities in England to inform intervention. 
METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH FLOOD RISK ASSESSMENT 
The way we interpret risk shapes responses. From a flooding perspective, it is the recent 
paradigm challenging awareness that the majority of flood risk in some cities may not come from 
the readily identifiable and geographically fixed floodplains and coasts that presents the 
strongest argument for a new approach. For example, as outlined in Table One, in 2004 in England 
there were an estimated 80,000 homes at risk from surface water flooding, a figure that rose to 
3.8m in the space of five years. It is helpful to reflect on the implications that this fundamental 
shift may have had on those concerned with flood defence. How can flooding be managed when 
traditional hard defence engineered approaches may not only be irrelevant to this risk, but there 
may potentially be hundreds of separate sources of flood risk which defy quantification? 
Moreover, how can probability realistically be considered as a basis for decision making in this 
situation?  
The first lesson to take from the English experience is regarding the concept of certainty. It is 
dangerous to assume that knowledge is established and that the threat of flooding operates in a 
definable and predictable milieu. Ascertaining the extent of flood risk necessarily demands an 
engagement with uncertainty; in reality we use unreliable and imperfect knowledge to provide a 
basis for action in how we use and manage land. Moreover, although the calculations may appear 
precise this is a highly transient position; in practice they are temporally static yet may be 
expected to be applied within a highly dynamic environment and be accurate many years into 
the future. We know climate change and urbanization will exert a significant, yet elusive, forcing 
effect on risk, but how effective will decisions be in five, ten or twenty years time? This quandary 
may be understood as challenging the principle of stationarity, a central tenet around which the 
analysis of hydrological time series is founded. Whilst it may be expected that precipitation varies 
daily, seasonally and annually, over a longer time series it has been assumed to be stationary – 
that is one record should be comparable to another (Zevenbergen et al. 2010). This data has 
informed flood defence and drainage strategies, has underpinned decision making and links well 
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with a probabilistic engineered-led approach. Yet surface water flooding transferred the threat 
of inundation to the urban environment, a changeable and expanding place that alters over time 
and space, sometimes significantly. Further, when you also consider the unpredictability of 
climate change, it is clear that applying a static, conservative methodology to what may be a 
highly dynamic environment can underestimate the threat due to a failure to incorporate forcing 
drivers altering the properties of a system.  
Whilst information on recurrence intervals can be of use in providing a retrospective indication 
of the relative strength of an event in comparison to past floods, its veneer of scientific certainty 
regarding future risk should be viewed as illusory. In reality, the urban system is subject to such 
significant variability that its value in aiding strategic decision making is actually of limited value. 
Indeed, a recognition of this statistical uncertainty has helped drive the shift from probability 
based approaches towards risk and resilience, as has happened in many countries in incremental 
stages over the last decade.  
The second issue to note is related to the concept of certainty and is regarding the subsequent 
desire for quantification. The development of flood management as being within the remit of 
experts, and in particular within the auspices of professions such as engineering and scientific 
modeling, created an understandable desire for confidence and surety closely associated with 
these fields. Quantification is not a natural bed fellow of complexity however; and as the 
uncertainty associated with flood risk management rose, so errors with this approach were 
exposed. In practice, the precise volume and location of urban land at risk from flooding may be 
highly tentative, raising questions as to the extent to which uncertainty regarding the existence 
or strength of a hazard may be reduced to a calculation of probability (Hanssen 2009). Therefore 
a methodology centered on ascribing a figure to communicate a notional risk and inform decision 
making may have flaws both externally, by creating spatial inequalities based on the availability 
of appropriate data, or internally, by only considering certain aspects of the risk, such as those 
which are most easily quantifiable. 
The simplistic language of risk calculation may falsely reduce uncertainty to a comforting illusion 
of deterministic, probabilistic processes within which the inherent gravitas of scientific 
calculations can attach a misleading confidence to what may be very cautious outcomes. This 
was a point recognised by Wynne (2009: 308) who argued that this methodology for managing 
risk is erroneous and: ‘the dominant risk science approach is more than a method; it is a 
misbegotten culture which inadvertently but actively conceals that ignorance’. Whilst 
understanding hazard management in this manner can be useful as a simple communication tool 
it is helpful to move away from a dominant view that risk can be definitively measured; it can’t. 
In reality, attaching a probabilistic value to a highly uncertain event may actually be an extremely 
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tentative judgement masquerading as hard scientific truth; as Adams (1995: 29) puts it: ‘risk is 
constantly in motion’.  
The acknowledgment that the management of natural hazards is connected to our perceptions 
and constrained by information in turn forms the basis of the more contemporary standpoint 
that responses are socially and culturally constructed. Beck (1992: 99) argues that the perception 
of risk has become shaped by the desire for quantification and the expansion of the insurance 
industry and referred to:  
...systematically caused, statistically describable and, in this sense, ‘predictable’ types of 
events, which can therefore also be subjected to supra-individual and political rules of 
recognition, compensation and avoidance. 
However, it was these ‘rules of recognition, compensation and avoidance’ that helped drive the 
shift away from a narrow, reductionist probabilistic methodology, as the impacts of the floods 
damaged the very political, scientific and financial sectors that underpinned the approach. The 
legitimate questions, as to the extent to which uncertainty regarding the existence or strength of 
a hazard may be distilled to a calculation of probability, drove the move towards more holistic 
risk management, where probability was offset by a more precautionary approach and a wider 
array of social, economic and environmental factors were considered. Achieving this shift 
required a much broader engagement with flooding than ever before, within which the 
management of water now includes professions beyond the traditional spheres, such as 
engineering and modeling, to incorporate all those with influence over support systems and 
particularly those connected with where people live and how they act. 
WIDENING PROFESSIONS 
As the previous sections argue, one of the reasons why the effective management of floods has 
been placed under pressure is that their causes have been influenced by the dynamic and 
uncertain processes of urbanization and changing weather patterns. Yet, it is too simple to 
suggest that these influences should equal more damaging events as there has been a huge 
increase in investment in flood risk management over recent years. According to the Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) (2010) the flood defence budget has risen sharply 
since the first of the major national floods in Easter 1998, with an estimated £765 million forecast 
in the 2010/11 financial year, in comparison with £310 million in 1997/98 and £590 million in 
2007/08. This also partly explains why flooding from the rivers and the sea has arguably become 
better managed, as this spending was mainly focused upon new capital projects, and to a lesser, 
although annually rising extent, on the maintenance of existing structural defences. 
This may also help clarify why technologically, financially and scientifically well resourced nations, 
such as those within Europe and North America in particular, are experiencing a similar rising 
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frequency of floods as countries elsewhere, as human activity – from the burning of fossils fuels 
to urban development - can help to create new risks or shift existing ones. The move in the 
sources of risk towards threats from surface water, closely related to a highly developed built 
environment, did provide a specific funding problem however, as the agencies with power over 
flood defence spending were not configured to positively influence the flow of water in urban or 
rural areas, which would mainly rest with the local water and sewerage provider, the agricultural 
sector and local authorities. The need to address the issue of stationarity also ensured that those 
professions with influence over future risks, from controlling new development to increasing the 
ability to store water within the catchment more generically, also became important actors in 
flood risk management; with spatial planners now firmly at the forefront. 
Although it was the Easter 1998 floods that proved the catalyst for the first planning policy 
guidance on flooding released a few years later (Department of the Environment, Transport and 
the Regions 2001) the role of planning in managing this risk was still in its infancy and in 
comparison to the established professions it was very much the junior partner. Over the decade 
its role steadily grew however, as its contribution became more widely accepted and planners 
more adept at exerting influence in this unfamiliar sphere (White and Howe 2002; White and 
Richards 2007). The new emphasis for the planning profession was also reinforced in related 
scientific research (Evans et al. 2004) and policy documents, with, for example, Defra (2004: 7) 
stating: 
The Government is committed to ensuring that its development and planning policy seeks 
where possible to reduce, and certainly not to add to, the overall level of flood risk. 
The growing threat of surface water flooding continues to bring a real critical mass to this shift 
however, and is essentially helping to widen responsibility from the engineering-led professions 
towards those concerned with people and places, and in particular those with influence over the 
interaction between the built and natural environments. Spatial planning is now accepted as one 
of the key mechanisms to avoid, reduce and manage flood risks (Communities and Local 
Government 2010) and operationalise the paradigm shift initiated in the early 21st century. 
Structural and non-structural options are now routinely considered as viable measures in both 
reducing risks and adapting in the future, although the differing actors and agencies involved 
increase the potential for more effective strategies.  They also instill a greater complexity of policy 
choices and the need to construct negotiated policy agreements across this growing network of 
stakeholders. 
The role of the professions is not just an external relationship, where the involvement of more 
skills and knowledge should lead to better decisions, but also an internal dialogue – wherein 
discourse within and between people and organisations in key sectors takes place. Enacting such 
a shift in governance from the technical towards more complex socio-technical assemblages 
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inevitably takes time to become effective in practice, particularly where the risk is subject to 
uncertain spatial and temporal influences. To operationalise the new paradigm therefore 
requires changes to how professionals understand, and act upon, flood risk across a broad range 
of areas, and potentially within sectors without the long history of flood management as detailed 
in the first part of the chapter. As the next section will emphasise however, not only do multiple 
agencies communicate more effectively, but this approach also means that responsibility now 
goes way beyond the formal professions towards the citizen and their relationship with both the 
state and the market.  
DEVOLVED STAKEHOLDER RESPONSIBILITIES 
One significant implication of the move from flood defence to flood risk management was that 
the simple chain of responsibility between the State and its key managerial organization in this 
area, the Environment Agency, was unraveled. The ‘living with risk’ agenda, within which 
prevention is advocated alongside an ability to cope with any possible impacts, could be pursued 
across multiple scales and professions; including the public sector, the private sector, 
communities, households or even individuals. As problems could be exacerbated by forces 
beyond the control of any one agency there was also an onus on shared responsibilities. Although 
the newer strategy adopts a similarly spatial approach as previously, the re-examination of scale 
better reflects the realities of the risk and, significantly, artificial administrative boundaries 
became challenged as inappropriate with new plans advocated at the city, catchment or regional 
scales. Whilst recognising the wider variety of professions with the ability to influence flood risk 
and providing a broader array of mechanisms to influence policy options and outcomes was a 
clear step forward, there is still an ongoing need to work together better, as actions in one part 
of the catchment can have a significant affect elsewhere. A good example of this is detailed in 
Figure 4 where the Greater Manchester region in North West England has been broken into its 
ten local authorities to better demonstrate the interconnected hydrology. Each area details both 
the future housing targets to 2021 and the direction of water flow between the most significant 
rivers and canals.  
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Figure 4: Housing allocations and hydrological links schematic of Greater Manchester in the North 
West UK (adapted from Scott Wilson and AGMA 2008). 
The figure provides an understanding of the shape of the catchment, with water from the higher 
surrounding areas flowing towards the western side of the conurbation. The diagram outlines 
how the outer authorities essentially export their runoff into Salford, Trafford and the outlying 
area of Warrington, emphasising the cumulative nature of risk and the need for flood risk 
management to be a collective responsibility. Indeed, if all the housing targets are met, a total of 
145,100 new homes, and their associated infrastructure, will be constructed upstream of Salford 
by 2021, an area already at relatively high risk of flooding. The externally driven hazard argues 
for inclusive partnerships and spatial policies that are coherent with the priorities of neighbouring 
authorities. 
The new roles also extend beyond the public sector and related professions. The rise in 
information enabled the State to devolve responsibility away from the centre, with both the 
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private sector encouraged to play a part, such as via insurance and flood resilience products, and 
communities and people expected to consider how to reduce their own exposure and 
vulnerability. Facilitating the shift required information on flood risk to be collected and made 
publicly available, with, for example, people encouraged to consider their own acceptable level 
of risk by checking online maps provided on the Environment Agency’s website when purchasing 
a house (Figure 5). However, as with other risk management techniques these tools may not 
effectively communicate the certainty of calculations, utilise unfamiliar nomenclature and focus 
on spatially representing the more easily quantifiable risks from rivers and the sea (Merz et al. 
2007). 
 
Figure 5: A screenshot of the Environment Agency’s Flood Map service, which encourages 
individuals and communities to become more aware of flood risk (Contains Environment Agency 
information © Environment Agency and database right. 2012). 
The wider implications of the trend to devolve power and responsibility away from the State 
towards communities and individuals are still emerging. Risk management, like ‘sustainability’ or 
‘progress’, is one of those agreeable, pliable and nebulous concepts that it is difficult to argue 
against. Although a contrary position may appear to be counter-intuitive, the lack of contention 
does not mean that the concept should be uncritically unpacked, automatically promoted or 
unthinkingly applied. Far from being a universal good, when this approach is translated into 
practice there may be significant spatial inequalities within society, many of which may be 
unwitting externalities. Once individuals and communities are encouraged to take responsibility 
for the level of risk they wish to be exposed to, and protection from flooding commoditised via 
the public sector, there will inevitably be winners and losers. There are also wider questions 
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about the long term social justice implications, of both the initial paradigm shift and its resultant 
effects. The move to flood risk management was a pragmatic policy decision reflecting the 
unpredictability of a flood defence approach, but would communities actually want to live with 
water or do they just want the state to keep them safe? The implications of this final shift in the 
governance chain are only just being considered within academia and policy and, reflecting on 
recent history, there is a possibility it may require another serious flood event to shed light on 
the social impacts of devolving responsibility from the State towards the private sector, 
communities and individuals.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This critical analysis of both the shifting sources of flood risk and the governance implications of 
a change in approach reveal a cascading series of impacts. Some of these were anticipated and 
have been already experienced, others were difficult to recognise and are still being unpacked. 
Although flood defence decisions were made using the best available information within a long 
established scientific approach, this techno-rational process of considering hazards in this narrow 
probabilistic manner and using it as a basis for judgement not only fails to adequately address 
the differing sources of flooding, but effectively helps to immunize decision making from failure 
(Reith 2009). A reductionist probabilistic approach can provide a comforting veneer of efficacy 
and certainty but it may be a deceptive state where flaws can continue until the strength of 
detriment demands the need for a re-evaluation of the entire methodology. That is not to say 
that modeling is not useful, particularly at a large catchment scale, but it should be reinforced by 
broader knowledges and new understandings of local level risk management. In hindsight, the 
focus for intervention has been quantitative and based squarely on what is known; when in 
reality more attention could have been profitably spent on a precautionary approach cognisant 
of what is unknown.  
The shift in risk from rivers and the sea towards surface water will be one of the emerging 
challenges on the early twenty first century in many developed areas, particularly when 
considered in conjunction with the rise of more extreme climatic events and burgeoning 
urbanization. Flooding is subject to differing geographies, where, for example, the behavior of a 
coastal floodplain is eminently more predictable and manageable than intra-urban flooding, 
which is a landscape subjected to a wide array of drivers and affected by the powerful binary 
influences of the natural and built environments. Both risks are relevant to a modern flood risk 
management approach however, and this chapter doesn’t aim to provide a discussion of the 
dialectics of defence versus risk management, more a tempering of the former and recognition 
of its inherent governance constraints as a tool to address surface water.  
The hydraulics beyond the boundaries of the sea or watercourses are subject to the multiplex 
forces of urbanity, where water flows in unpredictable ways and can be constrained or released 
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according to what may be indeterminate pinch-points. One logical way of reacting to this rise in 
uncertainty inherent in threats from surface water is to make our cities more aware of, and 
resilient to, flood risks - and in this respect proactively and strategically influencing the current 
and future use of land is key. Therefore, it may be that the most significant shift in the 
management of water in England and beyond will not be the one from flood defence to flood risk 
management or from probability to risk based approaches, but rather the emerging transition in 
power and responsibility from engineering to spatial planning and from the State to the 
individual. Whilst there will always be a role for providing hard structures to defend against 
flooding, there will clearly be a stronger responsibility to link water concerns with where, and 
how, people live. The implementation of new, more appropriate policy initiatives, such as the 
European Flood Directive (European Commission 2007), may potentially provide the basis of 
firmer governance foundations but their implementation still needs to influence a complex 
managerial arena. 
Each disaster drives a spectrum of possible action from reflection to revolution; improvements 
which may not be achievable without first experiencing these potentially catastrophic drivers. 
Yet the extent and consequences of flood risk argue against such a reactive approach; should we 
only change in direct response to disasters, or should we use scientific knowledge to help predict 
and adapt? Whilst it is acknowledged that damaging events do have the potential to set the 
agenda (Kingdon 1984) or create momentum for policy change (Johnson et al. 2005), this is an 
unsustainable, reactive process within which changes occur after experiencing detriment. Within 
risk and disaster management, all too often suffering damaging events is a key phase as they 
stimulate reflection and reaction, but this doesn’t have to be experienced in each country 
individually and it is here that this chapter may provide key lessons. From a period of relative 
stability England became quickly subject to frequent damaging floods to the extent that the 
collective awareness is moving from a feeling of safety toward the more realistic viewpoint of 
‘before the next catastrophe’ (Perrow 2007), galvanising action to protect people and places and 
challenging managerial norms. 
It may well be that just as the flood defence approach spread across the globe during the last two 
centuries, the direction of travel from defence to management, from probability to risk, from 
engineering to spatial planning, and from the State towards the individual, will resonate with 
many different cities and countries. Therefore the strategies adopted in England, unfortunately 
at the forefront of surface water risks, and the resulting series of governance changes gradually 
developed to operationalise the shift in approach, may help others break the closed cycle 
between detriment and policy change. The new hybrids of knowledge and understanding being 
developed represent a logical response, but it should be noted that these changes were not all 
implemented as part of a comprehensive strategic redirection, but have rather grown organically 
as the implications of the initial paradigm shift adopted to manage this hazard became apparent 
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in practice. Other areas could use this international comparison to plan intervention more 
strategically however – the perception of flooding as one homogenized risk emerging from rivers 
and the sea has created governance frameworks which may not be well suited for responses 
beyond this conveniently quantifiable and spatial area.  
Whilst the move towards flood risk management greatly enhances the ability to both protect 
people and lessen any impacts, far from being a universal good, in reality when such a managerial 
shift occurs there are often significant governance challenges or spatial and social inequalities, 
many of which have only been revealed through experience. In reality, what may appear to be a 
simple, benign and progressive paradigm change has actually transpired to be a cascading series 
of powerful governance changes, the implications of which are still being analysed. Moreover, 
these transformations may require new socio-technical assemblages developed to manage the 
interaction between flood governance and human behaviour. Adaptation to climate change is 
not a predictable, neutral, value free process; natural hazards can challenge long held 
conventions and adjusting intervention measures can bring new and often difficult to anticipate 
problems. In hindsight, the governance of flooding in England has been revealed to be on less 
firm foundations than envisaged, yet the heuristic and sometimes harsh experience in addressing 
natural hazards has the potential to provide valuable lessons for elsewhere. 
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